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Triviality between Value and the Crisis of Reason A Reading of the Nietzschean Philosophical Perspective

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Abstract:
This article aims to analyze the phenomenon of triviality and its manifestations between reason and value, through a reading of the Nietzschean perspective, which addressed the phenomenon from a philosophical standpoint that touches many dimensions of its existence and social legitimacy, and of its dialectic with reason and with the various values that either accept or reject it, including customs and traditions, will and power, and triviality and the idols of societies and their legacies. Through an analytical philosophical reading, and after presenting the concept of triviality and then discussing the dialectic of triviality, reason, and value within Nietzschean philosophy, we conclude that this phenomenon is not merely one of the whims of human nature, innate disposition, and the unconscious. Rather, it results from an arbitrary practice in the search for value and belonging, or from submission to herd culture without any attempt at discernment or escape. Accordingly, Nietzsche calls for understanding triviality apart from false idealism, in pursuit of renewal, creativity, and the enlightenment of reason.
Keywords: triviality; reason; value; Nietzschean philosophy; Nietzsche.

1. Introduction

Modern philosophy has undergone a shift in its research contexts, particularly in the inquiry into the constraints and bonds that shackle the human being and restrain the mind from freeing itself of them and departing from any intellectual idol or herd. Many philosophical currents have addressed this question, as is evident in the Nietzschean perspective, when Nietzsche launched a philosophical revolt against the idealism of the philosophers and their idols, and against all the restrictions that the Church imposes in order to combat creative individuals who possess the skill and capacity for critical thinking and the courage to question, doubt, and refuse. Among the philosophical dialectics that Nietzsche discussed is the phenomenon of triviality. He offered a view of it that departs from the traditional conception, which held triviality to be everything that contravenes the idealism of social and religious sacred things, represented by the Church and other religious constraints that, in Nietzsche's view, present the human being as other than what he is, transform him from the sovereignty of the will to the authority of subordination, and turn him from the essence of art and beauty into an artificial, counterfeit image. Triviality thus becomes, according to Nietzsche, a crime that the human being commits and with which he defiles his own mind, instead of ridding himself of it by refuting the sacred things that leave him deprived of will and power.

Nietzsche holds that the prevailing morality, which he calls "anti-natural morality," has made the human being a resigned creature who rejects his vital instincts and suppresses his creative energies in the name of virtue and obedience. In essence, it is a system that exalts weakness and conformity and combats strength, ambition, passion, and freedom; that is, it combats whatever keeps the human being alive and creative. Such morality produces something akin to existential triviality: it empties the human being of his depth and will and turns him into a follower who lives by what he is taught rather than by what he himself creates. Wherever this morality prevails, mediocrity prevails with it and distinction is suppressed, so that the world becomes a space dominated by the values of the herd and of stagnation. When human beings lose the capacity for innovation, they inevitably live under worn-out values that entrench weakness and conformity in place of strength and life. Nietzsche's proclamation of the "death of God" is not a call to chaos but to the liberation of thought from every rigid frame of reference. Thus, through his philosophy, Nietzsche sought to overcome an age of decline dominated by counterfeit and superficial values, and he worked to deconstruct the traditional moral foundations in which he saw the cause of the atrophy of the human spirit and its loss of the meaning of life. On this basis, Nietzsche's philosophical proposition merited consideration and inquiry, and from it the idea of this paper took shape, especially since the subject has not received an independent or direct study in Nietzsche's philosophical thought, despite having been alluded to indirectly in many philosophical contexts and discussions. Our study aims to analyze the phenomenon of triviality in the Nietzschean perspective from various angles that touch different spheres of life: thought, art, morality, religion, and politics. Accordingly, we pose the following questions:

- What is the concept of triviality, and how is it regarded philosophically in the Nietzschean perspective?
- To what extent did Nietzsche succeed in establishing a philosophical project that reconceives value, emancipation, and creativity in opposition to triviality?
- What considerations did Nietzsche invoke in discussing the phenomenon of triviality, and by which did he deconstruct the sacred things that plunged society into absurdity and servitude?

Through this paper, we seek to answer these questions and to examine Nietzsche's view of triviality. To that end, we adopt an analytical method and treat the subject in two articulations. The first comprises the definition of triviality, or of the concepts that parallel it, followed by a general presentation of Nietzsche's view of it, as a critic of his predecessors and, through this genealogical orientation, a rebel against presuppositions that ought to be refuted. The second sets triviality against value dualities and against what opposes and contradicts it, such as good and evil, will and power, and beauty or art versus decadence and triviality, among other matters that we present on the basis of what we have drawn from the spirit of Nietzschean philosophy.

2. The Essence of Triviality: Between the General Concept and the Nietzschean Definition

2.1. The Concept of Triviality

Defining triviality may be difficult in scholarly contexts outside the framework of philosophy, since perspectives on it differ, the criterion by which something is deemed trivial is unstable, and it varies from one culture to another. Apparently, triviality is the antithesis of value and virtue: it is everything connected with the human being, society, and life in general that is vulgar and base, or that becomes

an object of contempt for others. It includes whatever draws the individual into the circle of baseness that sound reason rejects.

In Arabic lexicons, *tafaha* (triviality) derives from the root *t-f-h*, which is the opposite of *fukaha* (humor) and means "tasteless." It has been said, for instance, that the *tafaha* of a debate is what is marked by tedium, offering neither pleasure nor appeal; it is empty talk not worth considering (Hamawi, 2000, p. 185). Among the synonyms associated with triviality in Arabic lexicons, as found in *The Detailed Dictionary of Synonyms*, are stupidity, foolishness, rashness, petulance, silliness, frivolity, and simple-mindedness, all of which denote a defect and lightness affecting the mind and thought (Tarrad, 2009, p. 283).

From the terminological perspective of philosophy, Alain Deneault (2020), in his book *The Regime of Triviality*, defines triviality as everything that emanates from the trivial person. It is a state of vulgarity and silliness grounded in psychological, intellectual, and social dimensions. The trivial person is a debased creature, yet the vulgarity of individuals escapes their own awareness; they perceive it only in the criticism and mockery directed at them. It is also associated with fanaticism and authority (Deneault, 2020, pp. 69–71).

2.2. Triviality in Nietzsche's Perspective

Nietzsche is the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), one of the most renowned philosophers of the modern age and of the intellectual revolution built on the ruins of the Church, and the founder of the philosophy of power. The name of Nietzsche is linked with an abundant philosophical output in which he discussed numerous questions: religion, science, and morality. He is also known for a deconstructive project, later carried forward by Jacques Derrida and others, directed at everything that produces triviality in place of power and will, and in place of values, beauty, and art. For this reason, Nietzsche addressed the dialectic of triviality from a distinctive and different perspective (Badawi, 1984, p. 509).

In the Nietzschean context, triviality is an existential and cultural condition arising from the decline of values and the dominance of the "herd," which subjects the human being to the will of the group and kills his creativity and intellectual independence. For Nietzsche, it stands as the antithesis of creativity and excellence. This is how the age of triviality is produced: when the individual relinquishes his distinctiveness and is swept along behind the herd. To confront the age of triviality, according to Nietzsche, the solution lies in adopting the will to power, whereby the human being is freed from the shackles of the herd in order to create new values. Hence he held that the human being becomes higher through art and beauty, thereby representing the ideal model for overcoming triviality and ascending.

Accordingly, the meaning of triviality in Nietzsche is tied to his critique of societies that disregard genuine values and rely on empty or commonplace notions such as the morality of custom and tradition, which promotes the elevation of the trivial human being (the Last Man) over the superior human being; it promotes submission and contentment in place of intellectual and cultural excellence (Nietzsche, 1881/2013, p. 15).

Nietzsche considers that the Church and religious institutions in general fostered the spread of the values of triviality and herd culture, because they reinforced and supported the feeble-minded, that is, those who lack a critical sense and accept what is dictated to them without debate or critique of

beliefs and ideas. He held that what is called "triviality" is not a passing phenomenon but the direct result of a culture that suppresses the will and glorifies weakness in the name of virtue. By contrast, the authentic human being is the one who confronts this decline with a will to power that creates new values expressive of life and elevation, in place of obedience and conformity.

3. The Dialectic of Triviality in the Nietzschean Perspective

3.1. Triviality and the Critique of Custom (Good and Evil)

The nineteenth century represents a historical stage that brings together contradictions. In the view of Nietzschean philosophy, this age is the most bestial and infernal, the ugliest and most plebeian. Yet it is also the most truthful and honorable, and the closest to truth, owing to its ability to face reality without falsification. However, this age, despite its realism and audacity, lacks will, is thick with sorrow, and inclines toward darkness; European civilization appears in it tense, rushing toward an imminent catastrophe, afraid of confronting itself and revising its course.

The profound impact of Nietzschean philosophical thought is evident in the development of thought in general, for it contributed to surveying the philosophical and moral course of centuries of intellectual transformations that touched the domains of morality and science. In one way or another, humanity has moved in the direction of the Nietzschean vision for nearly three centuries, witnessing intellectual and moral transformations that accompanied scientific and technological progress, until the world reached what Alain Deneault calls the "regime of triviality," in which superficial culture has become dominant, with negative repercussions for the daily and cognitive life of societies.

Nietzsche expresses his critical view of modern society by holding that triviality has become a dominant feature of the age and a source of profit without regard to what follows. This idea reveals the depth of his rejection of the superficiality that prevails over culture and prevailing morality. Nietzsche does not attack traditional morality in an absolute rejection; rather, he seeks to re-evaluate its foundations, calling for values to shift from external, religious frames of reference to internal sources arising from the human being himself. Thereby, *Daybreak* becomes a proclamation of the birth of a new human being, free in will, who forges his values through his own awareness and creativity, not by repeating what he inherited from the past.

Nietzsche also establishes the existence of two kinds of morality: modern morality, which is based on the notions of good and evil, and the morality that arose within ancient societies, which were organized by custom and tradition. Here he stresses the necessity of distinguishing between the morality of humanity as we know it, "the morality of good and evil," and the morality of humanity in its remotest antiquity, prevalent in ancient societies and more closely tied to customs and traditions not founded on rational moral concepts. Nietzsche states:

> Morality is nothing other than (that is, above all, nothing but) adherence to customs, whatever those customs may be, and customs are simply the habitual way of acting and judging. Where custom has no authority, there is no morality; and the less custom determines existence, the smaller the circle of morality. (Nietzsche, 1881/2013, p. 17)

From this Nietzschean perspective, many customs practiced in societies are placed on the scale of triviality and in the rank of futile absurdity, despite the fixed and sacred destiny that people see in them. In reality, according to him, they are imposed on individuals and determine their conduct

without their having any genuine choice in adopting or criticizing them; the individual must be subject to the authority of the morality of customs, traditions, and conventions fashioned by the group in ancient times.

Nietzsche's mockery of counterfeit customs, viewed as absurd, culminates in their categorical negation: "Where there is no custom, there is no morality, for the moral sentiment has no meaning other than obedience to customs and traditions." The implication of his position is not a defense of the morality of custom and tradition against the morality of good and evil; rather, he approaches the subject with a deeper critical conception, aiming to deconstruct and understand the roots of the two moral systems. He also wished to draw attention to the relativity, fragility, and profound historicity of inherited moral values, and to the fact that what we today call "immoral" in reality meant nothing other than "outside custom and tradition" (Nietzsche, 1887/2010, p. 19); such conduct constitutes triviality from their perspective, without their awareness that their own practice has entangled them in its snares. The matter, then, is not choosing one system or defending it, but a radical understanding of how each moral system arose and of its effects on the human being and on life.

Amid the dialectic of triviality and value that surrounds customs, traditions, and all social practices, the creative or free person is regarded by tradition and the Church as morally corrupt:

> The free man is immoral, because he wants to be the master of all his affairs, and not the custom followed or the tradition. In all the primitive states known to humanity, evil was synonymous with "individual," "free," "arbitrary," "unusual," "unforeseen," and "unexpected." In those primitive states, according to the same evaluation, if a person performed an act that did not conform to tradition, he was described as immoral, and was regarded as such by the very person who had performed it. (Nietzsche, 1881/2013, p. 17)

For Nietzsche, the free man is not subject to the norms of dependence and the herd, nor to norms imposed upon him from outside; rather, he creates his own values on the basis of his experience and his vision of the world.

Nietzsche thus describes the moral person as one who carries out everything in accordance with law and tradition, like the Brahmin (a symbol of strict religious commitment). Such a person displays complete servitude and obedience to laws, to the point of seeking opportunities to apply them in the smallest details of daily life. This behavior may appear to be a virtue, but in Nietzsche's conception it expresses the absence of individual creativity and the person's reliance on external frameworks that dictate how he should live.

Nietzsche says in his book *Daybreak*:

> We must not be mistaken about the motives of that morality which requires people, as proof of their morality, to apply a given custom in the most difficult cases. Self-overcoming is not demanded because of the benefits it brings to the individual, but so that customs and traditions may appear dominant … As for those moralists who recommend to the individual, as the successors of Socrates did, moderation and self-control as his finest privileges and the key to his personal happiness, they are a mere exception. (Nietzsche, 1881/2013, p. 19)

In this text, Nietzsche directs a direct critique at traditional values and the morality of custom, which glorify self-sacrifice for the sake of dependence; for him, traditional morality does not aim at developing the individual or strengthening his inner power.

Nietzsche criticizes how this authority subjects original and creative individuals to guilt and remorse, hindering their potentials and capacities and preventing their freedom to think and to excel: "All forms of originality, under the dominance of the morality of custom, felt pangs of conscience, which made the horizon of the best of them darker than it ought to be" (Nietzsche, 1881/2013, p. 19).
The equation between value and triviality in Nietzsche places traditions and customs between two positions, although the character of triviality prevails in them so long as they govern the mind. For the human being is the creator of values, not tradition; had he consciously realized that he is the maker of this towering edifice of values, he would have worked to realize concretely the ends he wills for himself without being shackled by what is dictated to him from outside, and his confidence in himself and in his creative capacity would have increased (Zakariyya, 1956, pp. 57–58). For meanings, according to Nietzsche, and all the ideas that were considered "truth" or "absolute," are nothing but historical human inventions that were formulated and then sanctified unconsciously.

3.2. Triviality in the Balance of Will and Power

For Nietzsche, the way out of the moral and cultural crisis lies in the will to power. This is the philosophy he advanced to express the human being's latent efficacy and his capacity to overcome weakness and constraints. Nietzsche called for bringing out the deep human drive toward overcoming, creativity, and self-realization, whether through intellectual or artistic creativity, or through challenging prevailing customs and traditions and going beyond the bounds of the familiar. Nevertheless, Nietzsche stressed the necessity of not misunderstanding the will to power as a call to violence or to domination over others; rather, it is a striving to elevate the self, to achieve inner superiority, and to shed all the baseness that prevents one from enjoying the requisite level of will.
The datum of triviality meets the Nietzschean perspective on will in that power is the cornerstone of his philosophy, representing the power of creativity and excellence through the critique of traditional morality and the call to transcend it. The weaker this will grows, the more triviality prevails over the authority of reason, which is how he describes present-day societies, dominated by chaos and absurdity as a result of compliance with an odious systematicity. Nietzsche presented a philosophical vision aimed at freeing the human being from the herd and from the trivial. The will to power is not merely a philosophical idea; it is a call to liberation, distinction, and living creatively and powerfully (Nietzsche, 1889/1996, p. 9).
Nietzsche proposes the concept of the will to power as an alternative to the values of triviality. For him, genuine life must be an expression of power and creativity, not mere acceptance of reality as it is. The will to power also means striving for self-realization and transcending limits. Among the important sayings in Nietzsche's thought that are consistent with this context is his dictum: "What does not kill me makes me stronger … I learned it in the warlike school of life" (Nietzsche, 1889/1996, p. 9).
Life is a perpetual struggle and a series of constant challenges that the human being may face throughout his life; suffering, pain, and all difficulties are not merely obstacles or negative experiences, but are power itself. Fleeing from pain and suffering is the absence of the true meaning of human existence. Life, in Nietzsche's conception, is not the attainment of happiness or comfort; it is the continual struggle to overcome oneself and the tragedies through which human existence passes.

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The concept of the will to power is linked to the concept of the Overman (*Übermensch*), who represents the one who embodies the will to power at its highest level. The Overman transcends the constraints imposed by traditional morality and social values and creates a new world of values and meanings. Nietzsche said:

> All history is driven by the will to triumph through a power that knows no mercy; the will says: "Thus I willed, and thus I will … do not be soft toward your neighbor." Cruelty is the first principle of life. The animal fights in order to evolve into a human being, and the human being strives to evolve into an Overman. Every creature aims only to rise and ascend above the bodies of its brethren in humanity. The torment of the many is necessary for the triumph of the few. This triumph can be obtained only through aggressive, martial acts: the fight waged by the greater animal against the ordinary herd. (Thomas, 1964, p. 322)

Nietzsche sees, in invoking the will, the mastery and overcoming of the sacred things and historical legacies from which societies suffer, which make the present governed by the past instead of setting out toward the horizon. It is incumbent on the Overman to strengthen himself and fix his resolve lest he become soft or weak-willed, and this will come about only by becoming better and more wicked, and by reverting to the cruelty on which the joy and delight of ancient man were based. This harsh happiness that characterizes the Overman is nothing but the greatest blessing that can befall the herd of the trivial human race (Thomas, 1964, p. 323).

The Overman represents the individual who lives in absolute freedom according to his own will and values, unaffected by the trivialities that, according to Nietzsche, social, religious, or traditional moral institutions dictate to him; and it is he who likens the world to a laboratory of experiments that works to purify and select the best in order to produce the Overman. That is why we find Nietzsche criticizing the idea of collective compassion or concern for the welfare of the majority (whether in the middle or lower classes), because focusing on such people weakens the development of humanity and impedes the production of the superior human being; thus we manufacture triviality and live within absurdity and decadence (Nietzsche, 1889/1996, p. 10).

3.3. Triviality and the Smashing of Philosophical Idols

Henry Thomas says:

> There are more idols in the world than realities. In this view lies a great declaration of war. And the idols to which we must listen this time are not the idols of the age; they are eternal idols that we strike with the hammer. (Thomas, 1964, p. 323)

Idols in this sense are not material religious idols; rather, they represent ideas and beliefs regarded as untouchable truths, such as traditional morality, traditions and customs, religion, and even certain philosophical and political concepts that sanctify reason and logic. Here Nietzsche directs a scathing critique at idols, because they conceal the harsh and disconcerting truths of life, such as conflict, pain, and constant change.

Societies today live on the worship of idols, as the following passage states:

> Idols in morality, idols in politics, idols in philosophy … If we wish to deliver humanity from this state and open before it a broad, paved road toward a flourishing future, and if we are truly keen to give our existence a sublime meaning and to ascend in life up the ladder toward sanctity and loftiness, then let us cultivate courage in its most splendid manifestations and

> frankness in its most glaring forms, so that we may face the truths of our souls and conditions with patience and steadfastness, neither ashamed nor bashful; for in shame or bashfulness there is no cure for any ailment. (Badawi, 1975, pp. 163–164)

Nietzsche holds that what philosophers have handled for millennia has been nothing but mummies of ideas, and that nothing real emerged alive from their hands: "The apparent world is what exists, and the real world is merely a lie we add to it" (Nietzsche, 1889/1996, pp. 25, 27).

With this thinking, Nietzsche looked upon traditional philosophies with a piercing eye in order to free them from the murk of triviality and from the decadence of the theology of idols that had endowed the human being with the dullness of stupidity. Hence Nietzsche stripped truths bare. He likened traditional philosophical ideas to mummies, which appear preserved and protected but are in reality dead; that is, they have lost their connection with actual, dynamic life. Philosophers since antiquity (Plato, Socrates, and others) concerned themselves with seeking eternal, absolute truths, but they distanced themselves from, and neglected, real, true life, which is characterized by movement, change, and conflict. He says:

> The will to truth, in your reckoning, O wise men, is nothing but that force which spurs you and inflames you; that is your testimony, which I call "the will to conceive of being"; for you aspire to make everything that exists subject to your conception, so that it may become a mirror upon which the image of reason is reflected. (Nietzsche, 1883/2014, p. 143)

3.4. Triviality and the Overman as an Alternative to the Last Man

For Nietzsche, true life is not conformity to prevailing values; it is a continuous struggle against those lies and falsities (traditional morality, absolute values, and fixed conceptions of good and evil) that religious and social institutions have entrenched throughout history, in which moral ideas were simplified to suit the majority but in truth conceal weakness and mediocrity. The exceptional man need only regard life as a tremendous struggle against the lies and forms of deception into whose current humanity has been swept, and know that his mission is to nullify the false values that people have adopted in their scales of good and evil, falsehood and truth, ugliness and beauty. Hence he declares a fierce war, without mercy or leniency, on everything in present civilization that is weak and dissolute. Each side of these dualities has prevailed over the opposing force, either entrenching triviality or delivering humanity from it (Badawi, 1975, p. 165).

Nietzsche heralds to the world the birth of the Superman (*Übermensch*), meaning "the strong man" who is not governed by compassion. He attacked compassion, regarding it as mediocrity and weakness, and considered the virtuous society to be the one that gathers the sick and the disabled and then exterminates them by the authority of power. The ideal life, in Nietzsche's view, is to live on the edge of a volcano, in constant danger. Strikingly, Nietzsche's glorification of power amounts to a vehement deterrence of religions, so that the human being does not form bonds of sentiment and compassion with them, nor expect from their assistance a falsehood that leads to contempt. He regards this as part of the triviality licensed by the mind's dependence on a religion that contests the human being's conception of himself as having shaped his destiny without a partner.

3.5. Art and Beauty Confronting the Age of Triviality and Decadence

Nietzsche regards aesthetic and artistic values as the loftiest forms of expressing the will to power and as possible means of overcoming tragedy, chaos, and absurdity in life. He conceives of art as a pivotal force in human perception and understanding of existence, and as a path to renewal, elevation, and creativity. Nietzsche writes:

> The person who responds to artistic stimuli behaves toward visionary reality as the philosopher behaves toward existential reality. This person is a careful observer and takes pleasure in what he observes, because he interprets life through these images and prepares himself for life through these processes. (Nietzsche, 1872/2008, p. 81)

Nietzsche holds that art has a great effect on the human being and can change the way he perceives reality and life. According to Nietzsche, the person who responds to artistic stimuli (such as paintings, music, or literature) does not deal with reality in the traditional way that ordinary people see it; rather, he reshapes his understanding of the world through the artistic forms that art presents to him.

The person who appreciates art behaves like a contemplator of life, interpreting reality through the images and forms that art embodies, which gives him the possibility and capacity to see life in a deeper and clearer way. For example, art grants the individual the distance and capacity to contemplate his existential experiences indirectly, and allows him to re-evaluate himself and his relation to the world through artistic images that enable him to absorb and understand reality differently.

Art relies on creativity to create something distinctive that transcends the familiar, whether a painting, a musical piece, or a poem. Instinct is considered one of the fundamental sources that nourish creativity. Nietzsche holds that creativity depends on the human being's connection with his instincts as the inner force that drives him to express himself in innovative and unconventional ways; instinct is thus the source of creativity for creating artistic and aesthetic values:

> Among intelligent people, instinct is considered a creative and affirmative faculty, while consciousness plays a critical and deterrent role. But for Socrates, instinct plays a critical role and becomes a deficient monstrosity, appearing to us as a strange creature lacking mystical talent. (Nietzsche, 1872/2008, p. 172)

Nietzsche criticizes Socrates for not giving instinct its due importance: Socrates weakened the creative role of instinct and turned it into a merely rational and critical function. Because Socrates prioritizes reason at the expense of instinct, instinct became wholly rational for him and consequently lost its capacity for creativity, becoming merely a critical instrument. Hence Nietzsche described Socrates as "the unmystical being," because he stripped the individual of the deep spiritual relationship with life and nature that appears in mysticism and artistic taste.

For Nietzsche, beauty and art are fundamental to understanding and appreciating the meaning of life and existence: they lend the world a character of sublimity and depth and make life an experience worth living despite its tragedies and absurdity, for the existence of the cosmos and the world appears justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon (Nietzsche, 1872/2008, p. 257). According to Nietzsche, comprehending the potential of a given society is not confined to evaluating its musical creativity; one must also consider the tragic myths produced by its imagination. It is true that music is among the noblest forms of art and the most capable of expressing the depths of the human soul, and through it the emotional sentiments of a society appear; yet for Nietzsche music alone does not suffice to

evaluate a society, for it represents only one aspect of its creative spirit. He says: "If we wish to gauge precisely the potentialities of a given society, it is necessary not to look only at the music it has created, but also at the tragic myths its imagination has produced" (Nietzsche, 1872/2008, p. 258). Perhaps this is because those myths offer a more comprehensive vision of society and of its creative potential than anything else.

4. Conclusion

In his philosophical perspective, Nietzsche addressed herd culture in refining the concept of triviality and its danger, criticizing everything that causes society and reason to fall into its machinery, submissive, weak, and enslaved. He weighed the prevailing morality, composed of the values of the weak who constitute the herd, against what the strong human being ought to be; hence that morality is a source of triviality and decadence, and of the absurdity and chaos in which societies live with their idols, societies that reject critical thinking and individual creativity. After deconstructing Nietzsche's philosophy and his perspective on triviality, we arrive at the following findings:

- Triviality, in general, is everything associated with chaos and decadence, and the misleading of absurdity through a counterfeit mirror that displays values, will, and power while concealing chaos and submission. For Nietzsche, it prevails over societies, especially European society under the Church, under the pretext of sacred things, customs, and traditions.
- Although Nietzsche did not explicitly name triviality or use it as a term, he enriched his philosophical works with a critique of every absurdity and decadence stemming from obedience and surrender to the group and from following rules and traditions without critical thinking. This tendency, according to Nietzsche, constrains the human being and prevents him from expressing the will to power that constitutes the essence of life and creativity. This Last Man prefers dependence and conformity to freedom and responsibility.
- Nietzschean philosophy was set upon demolishing everything that deprives the human mind of the authority of will and power, including customs and traditions, the herd, and the authority of class hierarchy, and it replaced these with the ideal man and the idea of the Overman, who is unaffected by the herd and creates his own values through will and power. In his belief, likewise, art and beauty are a genealogical tool in combating decadence through thought and creativity.
- Nietzsche criticized ancient philosophy, describing it as idols of thought, and affirmed, through his piercing philosophical gaze, that it is a locus of triviality in its clouding of the mind, its surrender to the forces of nature and to kings, and to everything that obstructs the path of thought.

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